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JURISDICTION
This

is an appeal

from the Third

Circuit

Court.

The

jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals arises under §78-2a3(2) (d) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in denying
a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside a summary judgment for
excusable neglect? The standard of review of this issue is whether
the trial court abused its discretion.

Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d

1114 (Utah App. 1989).
The second issue presented is whether the circuit court erred
in denying a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to set aside a summary judgment
granting the dismissal of a counter-claim in excess of $20,000 in
that such counter claim was outside the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.

The standard of review is that this court may freely

substitute its determination of jurisdiction for that of the trial
court. State Department of Social Services v. Vigil, 784 P.2d 1130
(Utah 1989).
These issues were preserved by a timely filing of a motion
found in the record at page 103.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following provisions are reproduced in the Addendum:
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
§78-4-7, U.C.A.
§78-3-4, U.C.A.

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an action by a lessor against a lessee for unpaid rent
with the lessee counter-claiming for substantial damage to property
stored on the leased premises.
B. Course of Proceedings
On May 20, 1993, plaintiff filed an action for eviction with
a claim for unpaid rents.

Record, p. 1.

Defendant answered with

a counter-claim for damage to property stored in the warehouse at
issue.

Record, p. 32.

As the matter proceeded, there were two

counsel for the plaintiffs. David Church represented plaintiff on
the claim for rents and Robert Wallace represented the plaintiff in
defense of the counter-claim.

Record, p. 40.

On May 31, 1994, counsel for Rogan withdrew.

Record, P. 54.

Essential to this appeal is that Rogan claims that he was unaware
of this withdrawal.

Record, p. 113. A Notice to Appear was sent

to the incorrect address.

Compare Record, p. 77 with p. 114. On

June 15, 1994, Wallace filed a motion for summary judgment on the
counter-claim.

Record, p. 66. A hearing was held on that motion

on July 28, 1994. Rogan was not present for reasons explained in
the statement of facts.

See Record, p. 78 and Addendum.

On August 17, 1994, Church filed a motion for summary judgment
on the rent claim. Record, p. 91. The Motion was granted without
hearing on September 6, 1994.

Rogan did not respond to either

motion.
vii

On October 6, 1994, Rogan filed a motion to set aside both
default summary judgments for reasons explained in the statement of
facts.

Record, p. 103.

The court denied the motion without

hearing on November 10, 1994 and the formal order denying the
motion was signed January 9, 1995.

Record, p. 156.

Rogan filed

his notice of appeal on February 8, 1995. Record, p. 158.
C. Statement of Facts
Plaintiff is a lessor of a storage warehouse in Salt Lake
County. Defendant and appellant is an individual that leased space
and put a substantial quantity of valuable property into the
warehouse. The dispute between the parties arose when a water pipe
broke and caused damage estimated at several hundred thousand
dollars to Rembrandt etchings and other property stored in the
facility.

Rogan, not receiving compensation for the water damage

as he believed he was due, quit paying rents.

Hatch, the lessor,

then brought an action for rents plus treble the rents as allowed
by law.

Rogan counter-claimed for $900,000 in damage to his

property.

Record, pp. 1, 32.

Rogan hired one of the largest law firms in the state to
defend the rent claim and to pursue his claim for damage to his
property.

Record, p. 32. As his affidavit explains, his counsel

had told him that there would be large gaps of time in which he
would not hear from them concerning the progress of the litigation.
Record, p. 113.

His counsel withdrew and sent the notice of

withdrawal to an old address.
he received notice

of

Record, p. 114. Rogan admits that

some pleadings but assumed
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they were

informational copies and that his counsel was responding to them.
Record, p. 114.

Eventually, he learned that his counsel had

withdrawn and that a hearing was set for July 20, 1994. He thought
the hearing was to discuss the need for counsel and appeared at the
court on July 20, 1994.

Record, pp. 78, 114.

Upon appearance,

nobody was there and he learned that the hearing was for a motion
for summary judgment which had been changed without prior notice to
him to July 28, 1994. Rogan discussed with a court clerk that his
son was being married out of state and he would be gone on July 28.
The clerk of the court told him that the hearing date would be
changed and he would be notified.

To protect himself, Rogan sent,

before the scheduled motion hearing, a certified letter to the
clerk of the court confirming the conversation.

Record, p. 78.

Despite the conversation with the clerk of the court and the
confirmation letter, the hearing was held anyway and summary
judgment was entered against him dismissing his counter-claim with
prejudice even though it exceeded the $20,000 jurisdictional limit
stated in the Utah Code.

Record, p. 79.

Rogan was out of state for several weeks. When he came back
he learned that the counter-claim had been dismissed and that a
second summary judgment had been filed for the unpaid rents. Rogan
had always understood that the case would not be resolved pending
the rescheduled hearing, but the second motion was granted without
a hearing. Record, p. 115. Upon learning of the summary judgment,
Rogan took immediate steps to protect his interest.

Record, pp.

115, 122. Rogan then filed a timely Rule 60(b) motion to set aside
ix

these judgments for excusable neglect and because the circuit court
was without jurisdiction to rule on an $900,000 counter-claim. The
circuit court affirmed its earlier ruling.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This brief shows that there were a series of mistakes which
led to the entry of two summary judgments against the appellant.
Sufficient evidence was presented at the trial court level to show
that excusable neglect was present and that the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to recognize that there was a good faith
mistake made and that the appellant acted diligently in trying to
protect his interests.
The trial court also erred in not setting aside at least the
judgment on the counter-claim as the jurisdictional amount of
$20,000 was exceeded by several hundred thousand dollars. Even if
the trial court had found correctly that excusable neglect was not
present, there was no jurisdiction to enter both summary judgments
for the plaintiff.

x

ARGUMENT
I.
IT WAS ERROR NOT TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTER-CLAIM
A. Applicable Law
There is, perhaps, no principle more fundamental than a court
may not act where it does not have jurisdiction.

The powers of a

court are limited to those matters which may be traced to a source
of jurisdiction. Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public
Service Commission, 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979) .

Following that

general principle, the Circuit Court Act of 1977 provides for the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of this state in Title 78,
Chapter 4.

Specifically, §78-4-7 provides that the circuit court

has civil jurisdiction in all matters in which the sum claimed is
less than $20,000.

This grant of jurisdiction is reenforced by

§78-3-4(3) which provides that judges of the district court may
transfer to the circuit courts cases filed in the district court
which also fall under the jurisdiction of the circuit court. This
power to transfer cases implies that smaller cases are to be
primarily considered in the circuit courts.
In Maxwell v. Maxwell. 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990), this
court held that where a motion to vacate a judgment is based upon
a claim of no jurisdiction the trial court has no discretion but to
vacate the judgment if jurisdiction did not exist.

Utah case law

appears silent on whether a default leading to a judgment may stand
where there was no jurisdiction, but other states have held that a
1

default

judgment

should

be

set

jurisdiction for the claim made.

aside

where

there

was

no

VanNort v. Davis, 800 P.2d 1082

(Okl. App. 1990).
There is no recent Utah case law

concerning whether counter-

claims in a circuit court which exceed the $20,000 jurisdiction
deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction.

However, in Hardy v.

Meadows, 264 P. 968 (Utah 1928), the Utah Supreme Court held that
a counter-claim exceeding the jurisdictional limits of a city court
deprive the city court of jurisdiction over the counter-claim. See
also Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1987) and Burns
Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Insurance Company, 851 P.2d 1209
(Utah App. 1993), wherein this court held that circuit court
jurisdiction is limited to that defined by statute.
Other states have held that when a claim seeks more than the
jurisdictional amount of the court, the court does not have
jurisdiction

over

the

subject

matter.

See Alder

v.

Crest

Corporation, 472 P.2d 310 (Idaho 1970); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v.
Portland Trading Company. 608 P.2d 577 (Or. App. 1980).
In summary, a fair statement of existing law is that a court
may act only where it has jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the
circuit courts in Utah is defined by statute to be civil matters
involving claims of less than $20,000.

A claim in excess of the

jurisdictional amount is outside the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.

2

B. Judgment on the Counter-claim Should be Set Aside.
If one applies the facts of this case to the objectively
stated rules above, it becomes readily apparent that the judgment
dismissing with prejudice the counter-claim should have been set
aside by the trial court.

The counter-claim, found at Record,

p.32, was for $911,400.00. This is obviously far in excess of the
$20,000.00 jurisdictional limit of the circuit court.
Rogan moved under Rule 60(b)(5) that the judgment should be
set aside because it was void.

Record, p. 103. The circuit court

should have followed Maxwe11 v. Maxwe11, described above, and
vacated the judgment upon a finding of no jurisdiction.

The

conclusion is surprisingly simple, and the denial of the Rule
60(b)(5) request was plain error.
In State Department of Social Services v. Vigil, 784 P.2d 1130
(Utah 1989), the court held a challenge to jurisdiction is a matter
for which this court may freely substitute its judgment for that of
the trial court.

This standard of review allows this court to

correct the error made in the circuit court by declaring the
judgment entered upon the counter-claim to be void and without
legal effect.
II.
FAILURE TO SET ASIDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ORIGINAL CLAIM
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A. Applicable Law
The recitation of facts describes a scenario in which a person
who thought he was represented by counsel had, in effect, defaults
3

entered on motions for summary judgment against him despite good
faith efforts to appear and defend against the two motions once he
understood his procedural status.
The general rule is that the judgment is to be sustained
unless cause to set it aside exists under Rule 60(b). Arnica Mutual
Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) . The
reasons for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) include
excusable neglect.

Such a motion must be brought within three

months of entry of the judgment. Existence of excusable neglect is
for consideration by the trial court and will be reversed on appeal
only where it is shown an abuse of discretion has occurred.
Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147
(Utah 1994).
One seeking to set aside a judgment under 60(b) must not only
show that

the motion

meritorious defense.

is timely, but

also that

there

is a

Ericksen. Id.

Motions to set aside a judgment for excusable neglect are
generally denied where there is a failure of a party to be
diligent.

Motions to set aside judgments may be granted when a

party has acted good faith and a default results from genuine
mistake.

May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984); Russell v.

Martell. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion.
Rogan made a timely Rule 60(b) (1) motion. The final order on
the summary judgment concerning the counter-claim was granted
August 3, 1994.

Record, p. 79.
4

The judgment on the original

claim,

resolving

all

September 12, 1994.

issues

in the

Record, p. 98.

litigation,

was

entered

The Rule 60(b)(1) and (5)

motion was filed on or about October 6, 1994.

Record, p. 103.

Filing the motion about three weeks after the last judgment was
entered is clearly within the three month requirement of Rule
60(b) .
The

facts

supporting

setting

aside

the

judgment

are

compelling. As explained in the record, at page 113, 117, and 122,
Rogan had been told by his own counsel that he would not hear
anything for months. The motion to withdraw as counsel was sent to
an incorrect

address.

Rogan admits that he

later received

pleadings addressed to his home, but thought that they were
information

copies.

When he realized

that his counsel had

withdrawn, Rogan appeared pursuant to notice given for a hearing on
July 20, 1994, the purpose of which was uncertain to him.

Upon

appearing, he learned that the hearing had been set without notice
to him for July 28, 1994. The new hearing date fell upon a date he
planned to be out of state to attend his son's wedding.

He

discussed the matter with the clerk of the court and claims to have
been told that a new date would be set and he did not need to
appear.

Out of caution, a certified letter was sent to the clerk

of the court confirming the conversation. This letter was received
by the court on July 26, 1994, two days before the hearing.

Mr.

Rogan saved the return receipt showing that it had been delivered.
Record, pp. 117, 120.

Rogan understood that no action would be

taken pending another hearing to be set in the future, but the
5

court proceeded with the entry of two summary judgments on his
default.
Rogan1s appearance at a court hearing and subsequent sending
of a certified letter to the court shows that he had a real
interest in the conduct of the litigation once he learned that his
counsel was no longer participating.

He actively took steps to

avoid a negative impact pending retaining new counsel. Any neglect
which led to the entry of the judgments is excusable in that Rogan
understood that he had taken steps to protect himself and thought
he was being accommodated by the court allowing him to leave the
state for an extended period to be followed by a rescheduled
hearing.
The circuit court abused its discretion in that it failed to
recognize that judgments entered upon default are not favored in
the law and that any reasonable excuse ought to be sufficient cause
to grant relief.

Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W.

Larsen. Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).

Mr. Rogan acted in

a manner consistent with one who was attempting to protect his
interest but got caught up in either an apparent misunderstanding
or an oversight on the part of the court. Absent some affirmative
evidence that Rogan acted in a careless or disinterested manner,
the policy disfavoring default judgments should have been followed
and the judgments set aside.
The final 60(b) element that there be an arguable defense is
also present. Utah has not spoken recently to the obligation of a
landlord in a commercial setting for damage to a tenant's property.
6

This silence is, perhaps, due to the fact that the obligation is
obvious.

In Farr v. Wasatch Chemical Company, 143 P.2d 281 (Utah

1943), a landlord was held liable for failure to maintain a
warehouse to meet the known requirements of the tenant. In KellerLoup Construction Company v. Gerstner, 476 P.2d 272 (Colo. App.
1970) , the landlord was held liable for failure to maintain a water
pipe resulting in damage to property of a tenant.

Under these

rulings, Rogan arguably may be responsible for the payment of some
rent but may also have offsetting claims under his counter-claim
for damage to his property.

Absent a trial to discover the scope

and terms of the obligations of the parties, there is an arguable
defense that rent may not even be due.
Certainly, a judgment of treble the amount claimed in the
context of no jurisdiction for the counter-claim, a default entry
of summary judgment, and circumstances wherein the court itself was
involved

in

leading

Rogan

to

excusable

neglect,

raises

a

substantial question of whether such a judgment ought to stand in
light of available defenses and the counter-claim.

This court

should find that an abuse of discretion occurred under these
circumstances and set aside the judgments.
In addition to excusable neglect, there is a substantial
question of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter a
judgment on the original claim where it lacked jurisdiction on the
counter-claim.

That question has not been resolved in Utah law.

Some help is found in Carreathers v. Carreathers. 654 P.2d 871
(Colo. App. 1982), there, plaintiff filed a forcible entry and
7

detainer action and the defendant answered claiming to be the owner
of the property and that the property had a value in excess of the
jurisdictional limit of the court.

Though this was not a true

counter-claim, the court recognized that the defense raised, and
which ultimately led to the plaintiff having to convey a deed to
the

defendant,

made

the

total

dispute

in

excess

of

the

jurisdictional limit of the trial court.
Also helpful is Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P. 2d 1230 (Utah App.
1987).

There, two defendants asserted lien interests in certain

property in the amount of $15,000 and $50,000 in answers to a
complaint concerning real property.

The court held that the

circuit court, whose jurisdiction was $10,000 at the time, did not
have jurisdiction over the entire dispute where there were claims
in excess of $10,000.
Finally, §78-4-7 talks in terms of the circuit court having
jurisdiction in all matters if the sum claimed is less than
$20,000.

The term "sum" is not defined but could reasonably be

read to mean the total amount at issue in any pending lawsuit.
Otherwise, the rule would have to be that claims and counter-claims
arising out of the same subject matter are split between the
district and circuit courts depending on amount or that the circuit
court would have jurisdiction over all claims provided the claim
filed by the plaintiff was within the jurisdictional limit.
Both of these alternatives are contrary to good policy.

The

splitting of claims only increases the amount of litigation in the
courts and sets up lawsuits for differing results from different
8

triers of fact.

Allowing the circuit court to consider counter-

claims in excess of $20,000 would be to avoid the policy expressed
in Title 78 that circuit courts have a jurisdictional limit to
consider more minor matters than the district court.

The only

logical conclusion is that jurisdiction of the circuit courts
should be interpreted to mean that if any party claims more than
$20,000 then the case belongs in the district courts.
To avoid the problems that come with separating claims and
counter-claims

into different

courts based

on

jurisdictional

amounts, this court should hold that when a counter-claim is in
excess of $20,000, jurisdiction is lost and the entire case should
be in the district court. In terms of this case, even if there was
not excusable neglect, the circuit court was without jurisdiction
to enter the summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
This

brief

has

shown

that

the

circuit

court

lacked

jurisdiction to consider a counter-claim in excess of $900,000.
The court should have declined to rule on the counter-claim and
should have set aside the judgment entered on the counter-claim as
beyond its jurisdiction.
This brief has also shown that there was excusable neglect and
that the trial court abused its discretion in not vacating the
judgment

entered

on

the

principal

claim

of

the

plaintiff.

Additionally, with the counter-claim being in excess of the $20,000
jurisdictional

limit,

the

circuit
9

court

was

deprived

of

jurisdiction over the original claim. Utah law is not complete on
this point but common sense dictates that other approaches would
multiply litigation and have a potential for differing results on
claims of the parties arising under the different jurisdiction of
different courts.
This court is respectfully requested to set aside the two
judgments entered by the circuit court for lack of jurisdiction and
excusable neglect.
DATED THIS 14th day of April, 1995.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY J>/S^N0ERSip:ESQ.
SANDRA Lr STEINVOORT, ESQ,
Attorneys for Defendant
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ADDENDUM
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

A-2

§78-3-4, U.C.A

A-4

§78-4-7, U.C.A

A-6

Letter dated July 20, 1994 from Record, p. 78

A-8

11

RULE 60, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

A-2

Ride 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining amy relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.

§78-3-4,

A-4

U.C.A.

78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court —
Appeals — Jurisdiction when court does not
exist.
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other
writs necessary to carry into effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding officer of the Judicial
Council and subject to policies established by the Judicial Council, cases filed
in the district court, which are also within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
circuit court, may be transferred to the circuit court by the presiding judge of
the district court in multiple judge districts or the district court judge in
single judge districts. The transfer of these cases may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon the motion of either party for adjudication. When
an order is made transferring a case, the court shall transmit the pleadings
and papers to the circuit court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been originally commenced
in the circuit court and any appeals fromfinaljudgments shall be to the Court
of Appeals.
(4) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of the district
court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3.
(5) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act,
and shall comply with the requirements of that chapter, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
(6) When a circuit court is given original or appellate jurisdiction of a
matter and no such court exists in the county of proper venue, the district
court shall have jurisdiction. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-14.5, criminal
fines and forfeitures collected in such cases shall be distributed as if filed in
the circuit court. Notwithstanding Section 78-3-16.5, civil filing fees in such
cases shall be the same as if filed in the circuit court, ^he party filing a
pleading or other document shall, at the time of filing, provide proof that the
pleading or other document qualifies for the circuit court fee.

§78-4-7,

A-6

U.C.A.

78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions.
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, except:
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding
actions to foreclose mechanics' liens;
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court.
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(801)
355-6717
CERTIFIED MAIL
S ^
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

July 20, 1994
Debbie Peterson, Deputy Clerk
Salt Lake Department Court
Third Circuit Court Building
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

CASE NO. 930005684 CV
HONORABLE PHILIP K. PALMER
PAUL HATCH, DBA P H PROPERTIES
-VSKEVIN ROGAN, DBA SIERRA PROPERTIES

Dear Ms. Peterson:
This is to confirm my conversation with your office (Candy)
at approximately 8:30 am today, July 20, 1994, regarding my
notice to appear. I was informed by Candy that the above
referenced case had been set-over to July 28, 1994, at 9:00
am. I had not received any notice of this change of date
from the 20th to the 28th, and my plans and commitments (my
son's wedding out of state, planned for over six irfonths) will
not have me returning to Salt Lake City until after August
10, 1994. I respectively request a date for this case be set
for sometime after that.
Please note I was there and available to appear on the 20th,
as requested by the Court.
Had I been sent notice of the
change, I would have communicated the date conflict and
request sooner.
I appreciate your consideration and look forward to receiving
your response as soon as possible.
Very truly yours,

| w

/Cp^—

Kevin Rogarr

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 14th day of April, 1995, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
David L. Church
Attorney for Plaintiff
560 East 200 South Suite 220
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Robert R. Wallace, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970
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